Autonomy of the Auditor General in Zambia: An Analysis of the Law

Abstract

This study analysed the legal framework governing the autonomy of the Office of the Auditor General in Zambia and assessed the extent to which they support or limit its independence and operational effectiveness. Using a doctrinal desk research approach, the study analysed Constitutional provisions, Legislation, Case Law, International Instruments, Books, Journals, and Reports. Key legal sources include the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act No. 2 of 2016, the Public Audit Act No. 29 of 2016, the State Audit Commission Act no. 27 of 2016 and the Public Finance Management Act No. 1 of 2018. The findings revealed that although the Office of the Auditor General is constitutionally recognized as Zambia’s Supreme Audit Institution with authority to audit public institutions, its autonomy is not fully guaranteed. Financial, administrative, and operational limitations restrict its independence and weaken its ability to effectively oversee public expenditure and ensure accountability. The study further established that executive influence through the appointment of the State Audit Commission as an oversight body over the Office of the Auditor General potentially weakens the effectiveness of the Office of the Auditor General. It concludes that strengthening the legal and institutional independence of the Auditor General is essential for promoting transparency, accountability, good governance, and prudent management of public resources in Zambia.